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CASE COMMENTS

Just exactly what period is necessary cannot be determined. The
reason for the time requirement in this class and not in the first may
be that the agreement in this class establishes a line which the parties
do not even pretend is the true boundary. It is an identification, but
not an identification warranted by their title deeds, and so something
more than bare execution is necessary to make it binding.
It is submitted that the decision in this case is a correct application of the rule that a parol agreement to change a fixed boundary Is
within the Statute of Frauds. A different result might have been
reached if the court had stressed the length of time, nearly fifty years,
that the agreed line had been recognized and discussed the facts In
connection with the second class as set out in the opinion.
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INSURANCE-EFFECT OF DELIVERY OF LIFE INSURANCE
POLICY TO AGENT
"Insured" made only a part payment of the first premium at the
time of making an application for life insurance, and received a
receipt which, in common with the application itself, provided that if
the entire amount of the first premium was not paid at the time of
making the application, there should be no liability on the part of the
company until the first premium should be actually paid, and the
policy manually delivered to the applicant in person. The policy was
received by the local agent and he thereupon attempted to deliver it to
the "insured" at his place of business, but failed to do so because of
"insured's" absence. The "insured" became ill and died soon afterwards. The trial court directed a verdict for the beneficiary-plaintiff
on the ground that the failure of the insurer to give the insured an
opportunity to make the choice of paying or refusing to pay the
remainder of the premium deprived it of the right to claim that its
agent was not in law the agent of the insured in the matter of possession of the policy. Held: Reversed. There was no delivery. Monumental Life Ins. Co., of Baltimore v. Borders, 271 Ky. 294, 111 S. W.
(2d) 653 (1937).
The American jurisdictions are not in accord as to the effect of
delivery to the agent where the application provides for a "delivery"
or "actual delivery" to the insured.1 Almost every case contains some
factual pecularity by which it may be distinguished from every other
case, with the result that in a single jurisdiction there may be two
lines of cases opposed in tendency, and yet not directly contra. Ken" [Actual manual transmission of policy to applicant not necessary: Home Life and Accident Co. v. Compton, 144 Ark. 561, 222 S. W.
1063 (1920); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 104 Ga. 67, 30 S. E. 273
(1898); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Baltimore v. Otto, 153 Md. 179, 138 Atl.
16 (1927).]
[Manual transmission necessary: Powell v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 153 Ala. 611, 45 So. 208 (1907); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shoemakerr 126 Miss. 497, 89 So. 154 (1921).]
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tucky has not escaped this confusion. The majority of cases in Kentucky have denied that delivery to the agent was sufficient delivery.'
The court declares the principal case to be governed by Snedeker v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,' which apparently holds that in no
case will the requirement of delivery to the insured be satisfied by
delivery to the agent. This position receives some support in the
earlier cases,' but was never fully recognized, and is certainly not
6
the law at the present time. The principal case correctly states the
present law: delivery to the agent will be deemed delivery to the
insured only if, upon delivery to the agent, there remains nothing for
the insured to do to make the insurance effective.
The court insists that the principal case is one in which there
remained something of a substantial and controlling nature for the
Insured to do, that is, to pay the remainder of the first premium. This
question is rather equivocably discussed in the Snedeker case, but the
real basis of that decision seems to be that the requirement of delivery
to the insured could not be satisfied by delivery to the agent. In another case of like nature decided in the same year, the court declared
that the question of payment of the first premium was not material to
7
a proper determination of the case.
The later case of Commonwealtk If!e Ins. Go. v. McGuire," held
the contract was a completed one where "there remained nothing to
and the collection
be done except the actual delivery of the policy ...
of the balance of the premium". This case was exactly like the principal case except: (1) there was no emphatic condition that delivery
be to the insured "in person"; (2) the agent was told by the insured
that he had the money ready. The controlling factor was that the
Insured was "entitled" to, or had the "right" of, possession. Since the
"insured" in the principal case was not given an opportunity to make
known an intention to pay the remainder of the first premium, a distinction between the two cases upon this ground alone seems somewhat
doubtful; nor did the precedents require that a distinction be made
'Blue Grass Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 72 S. W. 1099 (Ky., 1903); McGregor
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 143 Ky. 488, 136 S. W. 889 (1911) ; Citizens
National Life Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 154 Ky. 88, 156 S. W. 1069 (1913);
Smith v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 157 Ky. 146, 162 S. W. 779
(1914); Snedeker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 160 Ky. 119, 169 S. W.
670 (1914).
'160 Ky. 119, 169 S. W. 570 (1914).
'See note 2, supra.
"Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 136 Ky. 339, 124 S. W. 345
(1910); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 94 Ky. 253, 22 S. W. 87
(1893) (cited erroneously as supporting theory that policy is delivered
as soon as placed in the mails directed to the agent. This case does
not even hold that delivery to the agent is sufficient, since it involves
delivery to a broker).
'Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. McGuire, 190 Ky. 134, 226 S. W.
402 (1920); Ky. Cent. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Pemberton, 212 Ky.
510, 279 S. W. 968 (1926).
7 Smith v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 157 Ky. 146, 148, 162 S. W.
779 (1914).
' 190 Ky. 134, 136, 226 S. W. 402 (1924).

CASE COMMENTS
because of the provision for a delivery in person. The case of O'Neal
v. Sovereign Woodmen? squarely holds that delivery to the "camp" of
a fraternal insurance organization is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that delivery of the policy be to the applicant in person. However, the court was probably correct in the principal case in giving the
ordinary meaning to the phase "in person". The O'Neal case should
be confined to its exact facts.
It is unfortunate that the court should have based its decision so
strongly upon the £nedeker case, for it may lead to the false inference
that where the application provides for delivery of the policy and full
payment of the first premium before liability shall attach: (1) liability
will never attach upon delivery to the agent; (2) liability will never
attach where the first premium has not been fully paid. Such an inference would be entirely erroneous. It must be emphasized that the principal case goes no further than to confine the rule of the McC-uire case
in narrow limits. In reverting to the older cases for its precedents, the
court reverses a trend towards making a manual delivery of the policy
to the insured unnecessary. Though somewhat unfortunate in its citation of precedents, the decision is not illogical. The fine distinction
drawn between this and the McGuire case serves to reconcile to some
degree the two lines of decisions in Kentucky which have caused so
much confusion upon this question. Where the policy expressly
requires a delivery of the policy to the insured in person, payment of
the remainder of the premium will be considered as "something for the
insured to do to make the insurance effective". But since the McGuire
case is not overruled, where there is no express provision for delivery
in person, liability may attach upon delivery to the agent and before
payment of the remainder of the first premium, where the insured has
0 M. FEUSN.
expressed a readiness to pay.

CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION

FOR PENSION AGREEMENT.

Plaintiff employees of defendant company were retired from active
duty with a promise that they would be carried on the company payroll at half-pay. The payments were to continue until death, according
to evidence of plaintiffs, whose only duty was to be to call semi-monthly
for their checks at the company's main office. After paying the pen
sion for nearly a year, defendant discontinued it. Held: no binding
contract existed to pay a life pension, since there was no valid and
sufficient consideration. Plowman et al. v. Indian Refining Co., 20
F. Sup. 1 (E. D. Ill., 1937).
The court rejected plaintiffs' theory that the past service afforded
sufficient consideration,' either of itself or as creating a "moral obligation" or a sense of "appreciation" which could support the employer's
'130 Ky. 68, 113 S. W. 52 (1908). See also Central Life Ins. Co. v.
Roberts, 165 Ky. 296, 176 S. W. 1139 (1915).
'Holland v. Barnes, 117 Ga. 504, 43 S. E. 732 (1903); Willingham

